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Executive Summary 
Cyber security is a big and increasing problem. Almost every week we hear of a new exploit 
or security breach that leads to major concerns about our digital infrastructure. Software 
systems are at the very heart of this digital infrastructure. Therefore, while there may be 
many commercial, social and practical factors that contribute, it is certain that the decisions 
of software development teams must have a significant impact on the vulnerability of those 
systems.  
In this research we explored ways in which outside actors – such as management, coaches, 
security teams, industry bodies, and government agencies – may positively influence the 
security of the software created by development teams, while keeping the development 
competitive and practically viable. This means that the costs of such ‘interventions’ need to 
be acceptable relative to the risks that they address. 
We interviewed 14 specialists in introducing software security to development teams. Based 
on a rigorous analysis of their responses, we were surprised to find that three of the most 
cost effective and scalable interventions are ‘cultural interventions’ – ones that work to 
influence the working of development teams, rather than the artefacts they produce:   
1. Developing a ‘threat model’ and using that model to achieve commercially 
negotiated, risk based, agreement how threats are to be addressed;  
2. A motivational workshop engaging the team with the genuine security problems as 
they affect their specific projects, while making it clear how they are to address 
those problems; and 
3. Continuing ‘nudges’ to the developers to remind them of the importance of security. 
The other two low-cost and effective interventions relate to the code produced. 
4. The use of source code analysis tools; and 
5. The informed choice of components based on their security quality. 
We therefore suggest that providing guidelines, technical support and mentoring in each of 
these five interventions will have a significant effect on improving the security quality of 
code developed in future. 
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1 Introduction 
Cyber security is a major issue. With a major exploit being described in the media pretty 
much every week, and increasing liability for companies who are affected, it is important to 
understand what can be done to improve the situation. 
While there are many aspects to an organisation’s security and privacy, the quality of the 
software developed by programmers has a large impact on whether or not cyber-attacks are 
effective. 
Accordingly this research project asked the question: 
What interventions can change the environment for members of a development team 
to achieve good security, considering motivational factors, choice of tools, supporting 
processes and potential blockers, culture, awareness, training and skills? 
We addressed this question by interviewing fourteen experts in the field, and analysing their 
responses. This report presents our initial findings; we believe there will be further and 
deeper conclusions from more detailed analysis. 
Section 2 describes the research we did and outlines previous work by others. Section 3 
describes some of our findings, and section 4 adds conclusions based on these findings. 
2 The Research 
We conducted face-to-face interviews with fourteen professionals in software security: 
Table 1: The Interviews 
CC Organisation 
size 
Organisation type Est SCM Typical Role 
UK Medium Outsourced software developer 
and consultant 
High CEO 
UK Solo Security consultant Low–Med  Consultant 
UK Large Security and military supplier High Team leader 
UK Large Research organisation Medium Research and 
support 
US Large Operating System Supplier High Security team 
leader 
UK Large Security and military supplier High Security expert 
UK Medium Software security tool supplier Medium CEO 
UK Large Telecommunications provider Medium Security expert 
UK Solo Security consultant High Consultant 
DE Large Software package supplier High Security expert 
UK Medium Software security service 
supplier 
Low-Med Training and 
consultancy 
UK Medium Telecoms service provider High Security expert  
UK Medium Telecoms service provider High Team lead 
DE Large Research organisation Low-High Research and 
consultant 
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All the interviewees were involved in influencing software development teams as at least 
part of their job. We chose them opportunistically, from contacts in the software 
engineering world, and devised questions to emphasise their successes and expectations 
rather than problems and setbacks. To analyse the interviews, we used Constructivist 
Grounded Theory [3], which establishes intellectual rigour with line by line textual analysis. 
Table 1 summarises the interviews, with an indication of country, organisation type and size, 
the main day-to-day role of the interviewee(s), and a subjective estimate of the ‘secure 
software capability maturity’ [6] of the associated software teams.  
We consulted the interviewees as experts, rather than analysed them as subjects, using 
questions to draw out what they themselves had found most effective, and what they had 
seen to be most effective in other teams.  
Table 2: Related Work 
Directly related to this work are two recent surveys of industry specialists. Such et al.[16] 
investigated the economics of well-known software security assurance techniques, 
concluding that public review and tool-based static analysis were the most cost-effective. 
Black et al.[2] investigated technical approaches, providing a good overview of the 
subject but coming to no conclusions. 
Many academic and commercial teams have produced static analysis tools; we found 
little proof of their effectiveness, except for a limited trial [24] that found that users still 
needed to be motivated to fix the errors. 
There has been some work on how to create this motivation and encourage tool use, 
generally based on Rogers’ ‘Diffusion of Innovations’ [15]. Several surveys [10,22,23] 
identified the importance of developers seeing colleagues using such tools successfully, 
something that most tools do not facilitate. 
Prior to 2010, the main way of getting teams to improve software security was the 
‘Secure Development Life-Cycle’, a prescriptive set of instructions to the development 
team [21]. However these proved unpopular with developers [5,7,14], and has been 
replaced by ‘Security Capability Maturity Models’ (SCMMs) [9,11], to allow management 
influence based on a variety of measurements. By stipulating targets rather than formal 
routines, SCMMs allow development teams to find their own approaches to security.  
Addressing the problem of helping such teams, a recent survey of app developers found 
they mostly learned security through web search and from peers; it also highlights the 
poor quality of many web resources [19]. 
Research on the effects of external consultancy [12,18] suggests that a single time-
limited involvement is generally ineffective in the longer term. Others have investigated 
the effects of developers’ professional interactions, identifying benefits from improving 
relationships with security practitioners [1,20], and encouraging challenging communica-
tion [19]. Meanwhile, several works [4,8,18] stress the importance of security as a 
business goal, driven from board level. 
 
Page 4 of 9 Developer Essentials: Top Five Interventions to Support Secure Software Development 
3 Exploring Interventions 




Most of the interviewees discussed a form of presentation or workshop to 
help motivate the developers themselves to understand and prevent 
security problems. Some did this regularly, as part of the induction process 
for new employees; others made it a one-to-one for each developer. 
Bigger companies do as much as a two-day security sensitisation course for 
every programmer. 
External consultants and security specialists described using an 
incentivisation workshop to establish their credibility. Often this is based 
on a penetration test of the software being developed. 
Few of the experts suggested merely ‘scaring the developers into security’; 
instead the consensus was to shock them, but leave them knowing how to 
solve the problem. Almost all stressed the importance of personalising the 
workshop to cover the specific threats for a given project and the reasons 




Many of the interviewees discussed the importance of some form of 
Threat Modelling with the programming team: of analysing the likely 
attackers, threats and commercial impact of attacks for the systems under 
development. One interviewee also pointed out the importance of 
recognising a hierarchy of attacks, and of addressing simple attacks before 




Several experts change programming teams’ use of plug-ins and 
frameworks. There are two aspects to this.  
First, using an insecure plug-in automatically makes the developed system 
insecure, regardless of the quality of the code developed by the team. So a 
‘low hanging fruit’ for development is to use only plug-ins that are well 
written and securely implemented. This is non-trivial, given the wide range 
of plug-ins available. For some environments there are web sites with 
security reviews of plug-ins; cross referencing – preferably automatically – 
with these sites is a powerful security technique.  
Where such sites are unavailable, or for new plug-ins, there is a value to 
code reviews of the plug-in. This does however have a significant cost to 
development teams since it costs effort, however much automation may 
be involved, and restricts the plug-ins that that they can use. 
Second, since plug-ins are widely shared, any weakness in a plug-in 
becomes known to attackers, and therefore it is important to keep plug-ins 
upgraded to the latest versions. 




Other than the Incentivisation Workshop, there was less emphasis than we 
expected on developer training as an intervention. Most use less formal 
training, in the form of drip feed workshops discussing the latest forms of 
attack, or new security techniques. Some included penetration and 
attacking techniques amongst the things taught to developers. 
However a more common form of training seems to be mentoring, 
typically by including programmers more expert in security, or by having 
security experts work closely with the team.  
Static Analysis  
 
Many of the interviewees discussed static analysis tools. Few saw them as 
the most important intervention, other than for security experts 
evaluating large bodies of code and for compliance checking. Most saw 
them as valuable in automating the removal of certain classes of security 
bugs, and as part of a larger security story for developers. However, 
several did not use such tools at all. Some pointed out that even standard 
compilers, used properly, can help considerably. 
When used for external reviews and audits, the tools tended to be used 
without extensive configuration. Some experts stressed the importance of 
configuring and even writing one’s own tools to suit non-standard projects. 
In terms of actual use by developers, several interviewees stressed the 
value of integration with the development environments. Interestingly, 
however, these were all the people who are involved in the creation of 
such tools! It seems intuitive that this would be a good idea, but we found 




Many of the interviewees stressed the importance of penetration testing. 
Several stressed the importance of a tight integration between the 
penetration testers and the development team. This can be mean 
embedding pen testers within the teams, having developers seconded 
briefly to pen testing team, or having discussion workshops. A tight 
integration means both that the penetration testing can be as effective as 
possible, and that the developers learn from the penetration testers. 
Unfortunately penetration testing requires significant expertise; this 
expertise is in a relatively short supply, and is correspondingly expensive. 
That also makes a programme of widespread penetration testing very hard 
to scale. Indeed some experts felt penetration testing to be inappropriate, 
or usually not very helpful. 
Code Review 
 
Another frequently-recommended technique was code review. Many of 
our interviewees were working with relatively expert teams on software 
security, and these had a consistent story about code review being one of 
the most important factors in their secure delivery.  
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 Some concentrated on code review by security experts, whether as a form 
of technology transfer, or simply as an external viewpoint. Others used 
code review by fellow programmers, with varying levels of intensity. Still 
others used a pair programming or buddy programming approach to 




A particular problem highlighted by some experts is that while the initial 
motivational talk may be effective, its impact is relatively short-term. After 
a few weeks or months the development team will revert to their previous 
insecure development approaches.  
To counter this, interviewees mentioned a variety of approaches, all of 
which could be summed up as kinds of ‘nudge’ [17] – small reminders of 
the importance of security issues. Examples include a security competition, 
positive feedback when a team achieves a secure product, using public 
security disasters in the news as lessons, and drip feed reminders in the 
development environment. 
Several also recommended having one of the developers in a team 
become a security specialist, not so much for their expertise as to provide 
a continuous reminder. 
 
4 Conclusions  
Our particular aim was to identify interventions that can work effectively with a wide range 
of development environments.  
We can identify two aspects of effectiveness. First is the financial cost; whether financial 
costs are acceptable will depend largely on the corporate environment. Second is the effect 
of team discipline. We might define team discipline as the likelihood that an initiative 
started by the team (such as code reviews, or test-first development) is still being carried 
out six months later. As some of the research found [13,18], for security initiatives this 
probability is often quite low. 
We know that teams can create secure software if they are both highly disciplined and very 
well-funded [2]; if interventions are to have any significant impact they should also work in 
other environments. Specifically they will need to work with teams that lack significant 
funding for security, and they will need to work with teams that lack the very high discipline 
found in many of the most successful secure developers. 
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Figure 1 shows how the interventions identified by our experts fit into these criteria. The 
horizontal axis positions each intervention in terms of discipline required; the vertical axis in 
terms of financial cost [16].  
Given that these are all interventions that the experts consider highly effective, there will be 
most impact from promoting the interventions that programming teams are most likely to 
adopt. We propose that these are the interventions that require a minimum of both 
discipline and financial cost: those in the bottom left-hand quadrant. We believe the other 
three to be important too; however these five represent ‘quick wins’ that will provide 
significant benefit. 
Of these five interventions, three – Threat Modelling, Incentivisation Workshop, and 
Continuous Reminder – are ‘cultural interventions’, changes to the ways the developer 
teams work. The remaining two – Static Analysis and Component Choice – have low-cost 
options for most environments (though their costs can range to very high). 
We therefore propose that to give maximum impact over a wide range of development 
teams, the best approach will be to provide guidance on how to achieve those five 
interventions. 
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